3. ’Tis rational to suppose that this knowledge should be given immediately by God, and not be obtained by natural means. Upon what account should it seem unreasonable, that there should be any immediate communication between God and the creature? It is strange that men should make any matter of difficulty of it. Why should not be that made all things, still have something immediately to do with the things that he has made? Where lies the great difficulty if we own the being of a God, and that he created all things out of nothing, of allowing some immediate influence of God on the creation still? And if it is reasonable to suppose it with respect to any part of the creation, it is especially so with respect to reasonable, intelligent creatures; who are next to God in the gradation of the different orders of beings, and whose business is most immediately with God; who was made on purpose for those exercises that do respect God and wherein they have neatly to do with God: for reason teaches, that man was made to serve and glorify his Creator. And if it be rational to suppose that God immediately communicates himself to man in any affair, it is in this. ’Tis rational to suppose that God would reserve that knowledge and wisdom, which is of such a divine and excellent nature, to be bestowed immediately by himself, and that it should not be left in the power of second causes. Spiritual wisdom and grace is the highest and most excellent gift that ever God bestows on any creature: in this, the highest excellency and perfection of a rational creature consists of. ’Tis also immensely the most important of all divine gifts: ’tis that wherein man’s happiness consists, and on which his everlasting welfare depends. How rational is it to suppose that God, however, has left meaner goods and lower gifts to second causes, and in some sort in their power, yet should reserve this most excellent, divine, and important of all divine communications in his own hands, to be bestowed immediately by himself, as a thing too great for second causes to be concerned in! ’Tis rational to suppose that this blessing should be immediately from God; for there is no gift or benefit that is in itself so nearly related to the divine nature, there is nothing the creature receives that is so much of God, of his nature, so much participation of the deity: ’tis a kind of emanation of God’s beauty and is related to God as the light is to the sun. ’Tis therefore congruous and fit, that when it is given of God, it should be neatly from himself, and by himself, according to his own sovereign will.
’Tis rational to suppose that it should be beyond a man’s power to obtain this knowledge and light by the mere strength of natural reason; for ’tis, not a thing that belongs to reason, to see the beauty and loveliness of spiritual things; it is not a speculative thing but depends on the sense of the heart. The reason, indeed, is necessary in order to it, as ’tis by reason only that we become the subjects of the means of it, which means I have already shown to be necessary in order to it, though they have no proper causal influence in the affair. ’It is by reason that we become possessed of a notion of those doctrines that are the subject matter of this divine light; and reason may many ways be indirectly and remotely an advantage to it. And the reason has also to do with the acts that are immediately consequent on this discovery: a seeing the truth of religion from hence is by reason; though it is but by one step, and the inference be immediate. So, reason has to do with accepting, and trusting in Christ, who is consequent on it. But if we take reason strictly, not for the faculty of mental perception in general, but for ratiocination, or power of inferring by arguments; I say, if we take reason thus, the perceiving of spiritual beauty and excellency no more belongs to reason than it belongs to the sense of feeling to perceive colors, or to the power of seeing to perceive the sweetness of food. It is out of reason’s province to perceive the beauty or loveliness of anything: such a perception doesn’t belong to that faculty. Reason’s work is to perceive truth and not excellency. It is not ratiocination that gives men the perception of the beauty and amiableness of a countenance, though it may be many ways indirectly an advantage to it; yet ’tis no more reason that immediately perceives it than it is reason that perceives the sweetness of honey: it depends on the sense of the heart. The reason may determine that a countenance is beautiful to others, it may determine that honey is sweet to others, but it will never give me a perception of its sweetness. —I will conclude with a very brief IMPROVEMENT of what has been said.
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